Computational Machines in a Coexistence with Concrete Universals and
  Data Streams by Moosavi, Vahid
Computational Machines in a Coexistence with 
Concrete Universals and Data Streams 
Vahid Moosavi 
Chair for Computer Aided Architectural Design, Department of Architecture, ETH 
Zurich, 8093, Switzerland 
Abstract 
We discuss that how the majority of traditional modeling approaches are following 
the idealism point of view in scientific modeling, which follow the set theoretical 
notions of models based on abstract universals. We show that while successful in 
many classical modeling domains, there are fundamental limits to the application of 
set theoretical models in dealing with complex systems with many potential aspects or 
properties depending on the perspectives. As an alternative to abstract universals, we 
propose a conceptual modeling framework based on concrete universals that can be 
interpreted as a category theoretical approach to modeling. We call this modeling 
framework pre-specific modeling. 
We further, discuss how a certain group of mathematical and computational methods, 
along with ever-growing data streams are able to operationalize the concept of pre-
specific modeling.    
1. How to Approach the Notion of Scientific Modeling? 
Modeling paradigms, as a necessary element of any scientific investigation, act like 
pairs of glasses, which impact the way in which we encode (conceive of) the real 
world. Therefore, any kind of intervention in real world phenomena is affected by the 
chosen modeling paradigm and the real phenomena under investigation. In the 
domain of urbanism and urban design, cities as complex and open environments with 
dynamic and multidimensional aspects are challenging cases for modeling scholars, as 
there are many distinct urban phenomena. Figure 1 shows a list of different functional 
aspects of urban phenomena in an indexical manner. 
 
 
Figure 1. Different functional aspects of urban phenomena 
 
In addition to the diversity of urban problems, there is a huge variety of competing 
paradigms for analyzing cities: the city as an ecological phenomena that is optimally 
adjusted to an environment (economic, political, cultural) assumed to be “natural” for 
it; the city as a thermodynamic system that needs to be balanced and which can be 
controlled; the city as a grammatical text with its own “syntactical laws”; the city as a 
biological organism following fractal growth patterns. Further, historical perspective 
provide additional city models such as the City of Faith, the City as Machine, or the 
Organic City,1 and especially, since the advent of computers from the second half of 
the twentieth century, city as information.2  
 
Although comparing to classical science and its engineering disciplines such as 
Physics, Chemistry and Mechanics, urban design, planning and modeling is a rather 
young discipline, when one does a quick search of the keywords central to this field, 
one is quickly confused by the number of approaches and the variety of practical 
problems within the reaches of the discipline. For example, A. G. Wilson’s five 
volume text on urban modeling is over 2,600 pages long.3 A broad range of case-
based canonization has thus emerged, and applied techniques are developed for 
specific urban functions such as urban land use, urban transportation, urban economy, 
urban social patterns, and so on. As a result, the lack of a more abstract categorization 
of applied techniques makes comparison between them very hard. 
 
Beginning in mid-twentieth century, General Systems Theory emerged as one of the 
main theories for working toward unification of different disciplinary modeling 
practices.4 In principle, the underlying idea of systems theory is the promotion of a 
unified view to modernist-reductionist science, which was diversified around a variety 
of application and functional domains. Although, interdisciplinary collaborations such 
as making analogies within disciplines, (e.g., hydraulic theories to describe biological 
systems) was not new, systems theory’s formalization, as an orthogonal view to 
classically diversified scientific and practical problems, reached to a point in which, 
according to George Klir, systemic tasks such as modeling, optimization, and 
simulation have emerged as distinct scientific disciplines.5 However, taking systems 
theory as a body of knowledge (rather than a specific and singular theory), one could 
expect a gradual divergence of its methods, starting from its unified principles. The 
advent of computational methods by Alan Turing in 1940s and later the 
democratization of computational methods in 1980s created a new diversified 
landscape of system modeling approaches. As a result, after fifty years we encounter a 
competitive ecosystem of different modeling species with different capacities and 




Figure 2. Competitive ecosystem of different modeling methodologies. 
 
Therefore, the first motivation of this present essay is to find a unifying (abstract) 
perspective for assessment of different (inter-disciplinary) modeling approaches, 
while keeping the diversities. We think toward this aim we need to investigate the 
mathematical and philosophical grounds of scientific modeling.  
2. Formal Definitions and Categories of Scientific Modeling  
Because there is such a wide variety of modeling approaches in different scientific 
domains, formalizing and theorizing the practice of scientific modeling is an active 
research area in philosophy of science. For example, according to Roman Frigg and 
Stephen Hartmann, there exist the following types of models: 
Probing models, phenomenological models, computational models, developmental 
models, explanatory models, impoverished models, testing models, idealized models, 
theoretical models, scale models, heuristic models, caricature models, didactic 
models, fantasy models, toy models, imaginary models, mathematical models, 
substitute models, iconic models, formal models, analogue models and instrumental 
models are but some of the notions that are used to categorize models.6  
Nevertheless, these categories are not still abstract enough, but rather labels for 
different (not necessarily exclusive) modeling approaches. 
To better understand of models, one can look at the interpretation of their roles and 
functions, and to distinguish the presets on which the different points of view are 
based. One of the main issues by which models have been extensively discussed is the 
relation between models and the way of representation of real phenomena under study 
(the target system). According to Frigg and Hartmann, from a representational point 
of view there are “models of phenomena” and “models of data”7 and within these 
categories there are subcategories such as “scale models,”8 “idealized models,”9 
“analogical models,”10 like the hydraulic model of an economic system, which are 
further divided to material analogy, where there is a direct similarity between the 
properties (or relations between properties) of two phenomena, and formal analogy, 
where two systems are based similarly on a formalization such as having the same 
mathematical equations that describe both systems. (Hesse 1963). Further, one can 
refer to phenomenological models, which are focused on the behavior of the particular 
phenomena under investigation rather than on underlying causes and mechanisms.11 
Further, there are models of theories, like the dynamic model of the pendulum, which 
is based on Newtonian laws of motion. Models can also be divided into ontological 
classes like physical objects, fictional objects, set-theoretic structures, descriptions, 
and equations.  
However, these categories of models and modeling approaches overlap and they are 
rather descriptive and neutral classifications than critical. They do not give us a 
measure or a gauge to compare different modeling approaches in terms of their 
capacities and their limits in dealing with different levels of complexity in real world 
problems. In this essay I am looking for a way to condition modeling approaches in 
different levels of complexity to examine their theoretical capacities.    
Among the above-mentioned categories, the crucial, but somewhat commonly 
accepted shared property of the majority of traditional scientific modeling approaches 
is that they are all based on some sorts of idealization. 
In what follows, I explain different aspects of idealization in scientific modeling and, 
following the issues of idealizations, directs us to the problem of universals, which is 
an old philosophical issue.12 
3. Idealization in Scientific Modeling 
In the context of philosophy of science, idealization in modeling has been discussed 
extensively.13 In principle, idealization is considered to be equal to an intended (over-
) simplification in the representation of the target system. Although there are different 
ways of explaining or defining the notion of idealization, Michael Wiseberg discusses 
three kinds of idealization that we refer to in this work: minimalist idealization, 
Galilean idealization, and multiple-model idealization.14  
Minimalist idealization is the practice of building models of real world phenomena by 
focusing only on main causal factors. Therefore, as is inferred from its name, 
minimalist models usually end to very simple elements that are informative enough 
for further decision-making. For example, the aim in domain of networks analytics is 
to explain complex behaviors that happen in the real phenomena by means of network 
properties such as centrality measures, integration, closeness, between-ness, etc.15 As 
an example, in urban theory, in the city science approach16 or urban scaling laws17 the 
final goal is to find a few main informative factors in cities such as city size or 
population in order to explain other aspects of cities such as energy consumption in a 
linear equation. Even though it seems obvious that cities are complex phenomena 
with many observable aspects and many exceptions, minimalist models attract 
attention exactly because they identify and state very general rules.  
 
 
Figure 3. Network analytics: Structure oriented modeling (minimalist idealization), Central Place Theory 
(left) and Space Syntax (right). 
City theories that seek to create archetypical city models are in a way minimalist 
idealized models. For example, Lynch’s City of Faith, City of Machine, or City as 
Organism or Cedric Price’s egg analogies of the city (city as boiled egg, city as fried 
egg, or city as scrambled egg) are characterized by few urban elements that are 
informative enough to explain each model and to discriminate that city model from 
the other models. David Grahame Shane shows how three above-mentioned models 
could be identified by linear combinations of three recombinant elements, called 
Enclave, Armature, and Heterotopia.18  
The second category of Galilean idealization as the most pragmatic type of 
idealizations happens when the modeler intentionally simplifies the conditions of a 
complicated situation toward more computational tractability and simplicity. For 
example, it is common in economic models to assume that agents are rational 
maximizers, or in transportation models to assume that commuters take the shortest 
path, or to assume there is no friction in motion models of the particles. The basic 
idea of Galilean idealization is that by understanding the modeling environment 
gradually, it is possible to de-idealize or to build more comprehensive models on top 
of previous ones. Therefore, the majority of engineering approximation methods such 
as systems of differential equations or computational fluid dynamics or biological 
reaction networks are among this category of idealized models. Further, figure 4 
shows how the idealization process in a complex phenomena (here, the agent based 
modeling of land-use transportation dynamics of a city) leads to a parametric and 
feature based representation of the real phenomena. This layering and 
parameterization gives the modeler the option to adjust the resolution (levels of 
details) of the model based on the needs and the purposes of the modeling process and 
the constraints and limitations, including the availability of data or prior knowledge or 
time and scale resolutions. 
 
 
Figure 4. Parametricism: Idealization of the interactions between different agencies through layering and 
parameterization of the real phenomena. 
The third category of idealization, multiple-model idealization, results to those 
models that consist of several (not necessarily compatible) models or several models 
with different assumptions and different properties. This type of idealization is in fact 
a combination of two other idealizations and it can be very useful when understanding 
the final output (the behavior) of the model is more important than knowing the 
underlying mechanisms of the target phenomena. For example, in weather 
forecasting, ensemble models, which (Gneiting and Raftery 2005) include several 
predictors with different parameters or even different structures, are used to predict 
weather conditions.19 
Further, from a systemic and functional point of view there are many models in which 
idealization is happening in (one) main aspects of real phenomena. To just name a 
few: static or dynamic models, structure-oriented idealization (in network models), 
process-oriented idealization (such as system dynamics,20 system of differential 
equations), rule-based idealization (such as cellular automata21 or fractals22), and 
decentralized interactions (such as agent based), all are placed in the above mentioned 
categories of idealizations. 
 
Figure 5. System dynamics: process-oriented idealization. 
However, considering the size and the variety of parameters and aspects in the target 
phenomena, idealized models create a dichotomy, where on one extreme the models 
are all general, simple and tractable, and on the other, models become complicated, 
specific and high-resolution. In fact, multiple model idealization becomes necessary 
whenever the selected parameters and aspects of the target system in each individual 
model (out of Galilean idealization for example) are not sufficient, but also add more 
aspects to an individual model, either making it more complicated or resulting in 
model inconsistency. This issue seems to be a never-ending debate in many scientific 
fields including biology, ecology, economics, and cognitive and social science, where 
one group believe in the explanatory power of models and the other group believes in 
model accuracy and the level of details comparing to the real phenomena.23  
Although idealized models have been applied successfully in many classical modeling 
problems, but this type of debate cannot be fruitful in dealing with complex systems 
as long as there is no abstraction from the current paradigm of scientific modeling 
(i.e. idealization). Analogically, an onion-like model of numbers explains what I mean 
by the abstraction in the concept of modeling. For example, with natural numbers (or 
more generally, integers) one can never grasp the richness of proportions and 
fractions in rational numbers (e.g., 2.6, which is neither 2 or 3 from a natural number 
perspective), while the introduction to the concept of rational numbers as the ratio of 
two integer numbers (e.g., 26/10) solved this problem. Therefore, by choosing 1 as 
the denominator, one can show that all the integers are rational numbers; while with 
rational numbers we have new capacities in addition to integers. Similarly, if we take 
an idealized model as an arbitrary representation of real phenomena by adding several 
of them together (which is the case in multiple model idealization), we still cannot 
grasp the whole complexity. Therefore, our hypothesis is that an abstraction to the 
concept of modeling is needed in order to conceptually encapsulate all the potential 
arbitrary views in an implicit way. 
However, I do not claim that one can introduce a new concept as such, but in fact in 
this work I am trying to identify and discover new aspects of a potential body of 
thinking in scientific modeling.  
In order to highlight this conceptual abstraction from the current idealization 
paradigm, first we need to explain the notion of universals, including abstract and 
concrete universals, followed by our interpretations of these concepts in relation to the 
notion of scientific modeling.  
In the next section, after presenting the connections between the notions of 
idealization and abstract universals, I will formally describe the concepts of abstract 
universals and concrete universals, which can be interpreted as set theoretical and 
category theoretical definitions of these two notions.24 Further, I will show how the 
concept of concrete universals from category theory can open up a new level of 
modeling paradigm.  
4. Universals and Modeling 
In the majority of texts written about idealization in the domain of scientific 
modeling, the notion of idealization is equal to simplification and the elimination of 
empirical details and deviations from a general theory that is the base for the final 
model. At the same time, the word “ideal” literally comes along with “those 
perfections that cannot be fully realized.” For example, circle-ness as a property is an 
ideal that cannot be fully realized, and any empirical circular shape has, to a degree, 
the circle-ness property. 
 
 
Figure 6. Enso (circle of Zen): Toward the ideal circle. 
Therefore, the idealization process in scientific modeling can be explained as a form 
of purification of empirical observations toward a set of given (assumed) ideal 
properties. In statistical data analysis, it is always assumed that collected empirical 
data follows a normal distribution function. Thus, one can convert the empirical data 
to a normal distribution function and utilizes from the machinery of this ideal 
mathematical representation (i.e. the normal distribution function). Applications of 
idealizations in many mathematical approaches such as linear algebra are enormous. 
For example, a Fourier transformation (Figure 7) can be seen as a form of idealization 
by which any observed time-varying data can be reconstructed (approximately) by a 
set of time-varying vectors (a set of pure sinusoidal waves with different frequencies 
and phases). From this perspective, any waveform phenomenon is a linear 
combination of a set of ideal prototypes. 
 
 
Figure 7. Fourier decomposition: Any observed form is a linear combination of some ideal cyclic form. 
However, these ideal forms (a wave with a certain frequency in the case of the Fourier 
analysis) as the set of aspects (properties) of real phenomena are abstract. This means 
that there is no concrete (empirical) instance that fully matches one or several of these 
a priori, ideal properties. From this point of view, idealized models are models that 
are based on the notion of abstract universals.  
  
The notions of “universals” and “property” are old topics in philosophy that can be 
approached differently, namely through realism, idealism, or nominalism.25 However, 
in this work I focus on the distinctions between concrete and abstract universals in 
relation to the paradigms of scientific modeling. 
According to David Ellerman, “In Plato's Theory of Ideas or Forms (ειδη), a property 
F has an entity associated with it, the universal uF, which uniquely represents the 
property. Therefore, an object X has the property F i.e. F(X), if and only if it 
participates in the universal uF to a degree (µ).”26 For example, “whiteness” is a 
universal and the set of white objects that participate in “whiteness” property  (i.e., 
with different degrees of whiteness) are represented by this property. Further, “Given 
a relation µ, an entity uF is said to be a universal for the property F (with respect to µ) 
if it satisfies the following universality condition: For any x, x µ uF if and only if 
F(x).”27 
This condition is called universality, and it means that the universal is the essence of 
that property.  
In addition to universality, a universal should be unique. “Hence there should be an 
equivalence relation (≈) so that universals satisfy a uniqueness condition: If uF and uF' 
are universals for the same F, then uF ≈ uF'.”28 Therefore, any entity that satisfies the 
conditions of universality and uniqueness for a certain property is a universal for that 
property. Now, if a universal is self-participating, it is called a concrete universal; if it 
does not have self-participatory properties, it is an abstract universal. For example, 
whiteness is an abstract universal as there is no empirical (concrete instance) to be 
“whiteness.” In language models, being a “verb” is a property that can be assigned to 
many words, but “verb” itself is an external definition and it is not self-participating 
in the sets of concrete verbs. The same argument goes for the above example of the 
Fourier analysis and ideal forms.  
On the other hand, defining a property as being part of set A and set B has a concrete 
universal, which is the intersection of two sets A and B (A∩B). It means that any 
object from set A and B (including all the potential subsets) that has this property 
(being part of A and B) participates in the intersection set A∩B, and since A∩B is 
participating in itself, then it is a concrete universal. 
Further, Ellerman shows that how modern set theory is the language of abstract 
universals and how category theory can be developed as the mathematical machinery 
of concrete universals. Finally, he summarizes that, Category theory as the theory of 
concrete universals has a different flavor from set theory, the theory of abstract 
universals. Given the collection of all the elements with a property, set theory can 
postulate a more abstract entity, the set of those elements, to be the universal. But 
category theory cannot postulate its universals because those universals are concrete. 
Category theory must find its universals, if at all, among the entities with the 
property.29 
In the past few decades there have been many theoretical works to further the new 
field of category theory in terms of this fundamental difference between set theory 
and category theory. For example, currently the main categorical approaches in 
mathematics are topos theory and sheaf theory, which are generalizations of topology 
and geometry to an algebraic level.30 It seems that applications of these general 
frameworks in different domains should be one of the main future research areas in 
the field of modeling. On the other hand, Ellerman concludes that, Topos theory is 
important in its own right as a generalization of set theory, but it does not exclusively 
capture category theory’s foundational relevance. Concrete universals do not 
“generalize” abstract universals, so as the theory of concrete universals, category 
theory does not try to generalize set theory, the theory of abstract universals. Category 
theory presents the theory of the other type of universals, the self-participating or 
concrete universals.31 
Now that we have defined the concepts of abstract and concrete universals, we need 
to formalize two different approaches of modeling, which are based on these notions 
of the universal.  
As stated earlier, idealized models are models that are based on the notion of abstract 
universals and consequently idealized models can be interpreted as set theoretical 
models. In the next section, by focusing on the idea of representation in idealized 
models, I show their theoretical consequences and their limits in dealing with 
complex systems, with the definition of the abstract universal being crucial. Next, I 
show another conceptual representational framework that is matched with the concept 
of concrete universals. Further, I will introduce an alternative line of modeling to 
idealized modeling. 
5. Specific Modeling: Models Based on Abstract Universals 
The fundamental difference between abstract and concrete universals is the issue of 
self-participation. In terms of modeling and representation, in those models based on 
abstract universals, the definition of the common property of the target system is a 
priori, given in a meta-level. This means that in an empirical setup, we have an 
externally given idea about the set of properties (aspects) of the real phenomena under 
study at the beginning of the modeling process. As an example, if we are comparing 
many concrete objects (e.g., several apples), we first need to define a set of specific 
properties (such as size, color, taste, etc.) to construct a representation of apple-ness. 
Therefore, apple-ness is reduced to this external setup. We call this approach specific 
modeling as it is based on a set of specific properties of the target system. In relation 
to the idealization process, the level of details in terms of the number and variety of 
properties is the choice of the modeler. If the modeler considers few aspects of the 
target system the model becomes simple and if he or she selects many aspects or 
properties, the model becomes complicated. 
Figure 8 shows the concept of idealized representation in specific modeling 
schematically. Each circle in this figure stands for a concrete object. These objects are 
symbolical, which means that they can stand for anything—be it people, cars, 
companies, buildings, streets, neighborhoods, cities, webpages, protein networks, 
networks of words in a corpus of texts, or people and their activities in a social 
network. Therefore, in the first step, we need to define our abstract universals, which 
leads to a set of selected features of the real objects. These features are shown by 
rectangles. As a result of these universal features, the concrete instances of the object 
are assumed to be independent from each other, as they will be all compared 
indirectly by an abstract class definition, which acts as an external reference. 
 
 
Figure 8. Specific modeling-based abstract universals and parametric idealization of the target object. 
This is the underlying notion of rationality started in sixteenth century by René 
Descartes and it should be mentioned that it offers a fantastic mechanism and an 
abstract language for axiomatization of different phenomena. Nevertheless, there are 
fundamental limits to this approach of modeling in dealing with complex phenomena, 
with many different properties, where the specific models need to define an arbitrary 
set of properties.  
5.1. Limits of Modeling Based on Abstract Universals 
Within the literature of scientific modeling, the majority of discussions on the issues 
of scientific modeling approaches are bounded to models based on abstract universals 
and the differences of different idealization processes. Among the few investigations, 
Richard Shillcock discusses the fundamental problems of modeling in the domain of 
cognitive science from the perspective of universals. He notes: “Cognitive science 
depends on abstractions made from the complex reality of human behaviour. 
Cognitive scientists typically wish the abstractions in their theories to be universals, 
but seldom attend to the ontology of universals.”32 Later he explains several 
fundamental problems in the domain of cognitive science by reviewing the different 
aspects of abstract and concrete universals. In what follows I present some of the 
fundamental issues of the models that are based on abstract universals. 
5.1.1. Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem and Arbitrariness of Models Based on 
Abstract Universals 
In models based on abstract universals, the universal properties are not self-
participating. Intuitively, one can argue that in any level of abstraction, members of a 
set are concrete and the set itself is abstract with regard to its members. Therefore, the 
first modeling step is the decision about the set of properties that define (represent) 
the object of enquiry. To have a set of concrete instances (e.g., set of red apples), one 
needs a super-set that defines the ideal properties of that class (the apple-ness and the 
red-ness). This requirement (brought forward by Plato) initiates a never-ending 
hierarchical process of defining abstract universals for the higher order classes (e.g., a 
set for colors). As a result, one can argue that in practical modeling domains, from a 
level above, models are based on assumed or commonly agreed properties of the 
target system. This problem can be explained by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 
that is to say we only can make a consistent system if it is based on an unproved truth 
(the incomplete model); if the model is complete (every thing based on proofs), it 
cannot be consistent.33 This beautiful theorem simply says that any model that is 
based on abstract universals is in a way arbitrarily consistent, but not simultaneously 
complete. The same argument holds for the case of Russell’s paradoxes and naïve set 
theory.34 
5.1.2. Curse of Dimensionality in Complex Systems 
Models based on abstract universals have been successfully applied in many practical 
domains such as classical physics, medicine, and engineering. Nevertheless, they 
reach a computational limit in dealing with complex systems. This limit is directly 
related to their quest for explicit representation of the target systems through a set of 
specific properties. Assume that we measure the complexity of a system (i.e., a real 
phenomenon) as a function of the number of its potential properties and the relations 
between those properties.35 In this scenario, in comparison to a building a wooden 
chair is less complex, and the same relation holds for a building in comparison to a 
city. 
As a result, by increasing the number of potential properties and their 
interrelationships, and consequently the exponential growth in the number of 
combinations, the space of modeling (i.e., potential specific models) expands in an 
exponential manner. This phenomenon is called the curse of dimensionality 
introduced by Richard Bellman in 1961.36 
Consequently, in a complex system, any endeavor toward an explicit representation 
(which is the case in specific modeling) leads either to a complicated model (models 
with lots of redundancy and lack of explanation) or to very simple and minimalistic 
idealizations. Figure 9 shows this issue diagrammatically. 
 
 
Figure 9. The curse of dimensionality and idealized models based on abstract universals. 
5.1.3. From Particular to Generic and the Concept of “Error” 
In the idealization process of particular objects there is no longer a unique identity 
dedicated to a particular (concrete) instance, but rather the identity of that particular 
case is realized as a combination of globally defined properties (see figure 8). In other 
words, in models based on abstract universals the particular object is considered as an 
instance of a (fictitious) generic object. Along the same line, Shillcock says: “The 
concrete universal is a universal, but it has all the richness of the particular. Whereas 
an abstract universal can be defined as something abstract (typically seen as a 
property) that inheres in many other different things, a concrete universal is an entity 
in which many other different things inhere.”37 
Consequently, constructing the notion of generic object through the lens of abstract 
universalism, we impose a limit to empirical deviations and treat them as errors. For 
example, assuming linearity as an ideal property in a system, the generic object is 
assumed to follow the linearity while other objects are erroneous to a degree, based on 
their deviations from the linear line. Figure 10 shows this issue in the case of linear 
regression. In a two-dimensional linear system, it is assumed that for any observation 
(i.e., a concrete object via its x and y dimensions) there is a linear relation in the form 
of y=ax + c. Therefore, those points that don’t fall in a common line have a degree of 
error in comparison with the ideal line.  
 
Figure 10. Introduction to the concept of error: the deviation of particular objects from the ideal line 
6. Pre-Specific Modeling: Models based on Concrete 
Universals 
In this section, we investigate the potentials for a new level of abstractions in 
paradigms of scientific modeling. This is not in opposition to specific modeling (i.e., 
models based on abstract universals), which is a common approach in social science 
and humanities, rather it is based on the notion of concrete universals from category 
theory. As discussed in the previous section, models that we call specific models are 
based on a priori defined or selected abstract universals. Further, they have certain 
theoretical limits and issues in dealing with complex systems. Therefore, my 
hypothesis is that if any specific model is like an arbitrary view to the real 
phenomena, there should be a category of models that encapsulates all the potential 
specifics in an implicit way. We call this approach pre-specific modeling, which was 
originally introduced by Vera Bühlmann.38 
If specific modeling can be theorized by set theory and abstract universals, pre-
specific modeling should be supported by the concepts of category theory and 
concrete universals. In order to establish the building blocks of pre-specific modeling, 
we need to focus on fundamental assumptions of the specific modeling. 
6.1. Dedekind Cut: When a Particular Object is Represented by the Negation of 
Its Complement 
In specific modeling, when one defines the abstract universal in terms of a set of 
specific properties, a parametrical generic object will be conceptualized directly. The 
individual objects can then be reconstructed (analyzed) or generated (synthesized) by 
changing the values of those specific parameters in the generic object. As a 
fundamental example, we refer to number theory and the definition of rational 
numbers as the ratio of two integers m and n, where n is not equal to 0. In this case, 
any specific rational number, q, can be directly represented by infinite pairs of (m, n) 
integer values, where m/n = q. In other words, q is graspable directly and 
independently from the other rational numbers. However, as we know the set of 
rational numbers are countable and they are only a small fraction of the whole space 
of the real numbers. As a result, this approach reaches to a point in some cases that no 
one can define a real number by its own. 
 
Figure 11. Rational numbers cannot fill the space of real numbers. Each line corresponds to one rational 
number. 
For example, √2 cannot be touched by the above-mentioned procedure. In general, 
this is the case for irrational numbers. A different method for definition of irrational 
numbers is required. In the late nineteenth century, Richard Dedekind came up with a 
different conceptual definition of irrational numbers, known as the Dedekind cut.39 
Intuitively, a Dedekind cut is a unique way of representing an irrational numbers by 
its complementary set. He defined a cut for a specific number, b, as the space between 
two ordered sets of rational numbers A and B, where all the elements of A are less 
than all the elements of B and further all the elements of A are smaller than b and all 
the elements of B are equal or greater than b. Definitely, if b is a rational number the 
union of set A and B is the whole number space of real numbers, U, and if b is an 
irrational number, b is equal to U minus the union of sets A and B (AUB). For 
example, in order to define √2, A is the collection of all negative rational numbers and 
the collection of every non-negative rational number whose square is less than 2 and 
B is the collection of all positive rational numbers whose square are larger than 2. 
 
Figure 12. Dedekind cut: representation of an irrational number as the negation of its complement 
 
Further, two irrational numbers can be compared through their corresponding cuts—if 
their cuts are equal, these numbers are identical. By this definition each specific 
irrational number is represented uniquely as the negation of its complement, while it 
is not directly touchable. This is opposite to that of a rational number, where it can be 
directly pointed out.  We think that regarding the issue of object representation, the 
Dedekind cut importantly implies that it is possible to introduce an alternative 
approach for representation of the objects to what is common in specific modeling 
(shown in figure 8).40   
6.2. From Generic to Particular: Object Dependent Representation 
The core aspect about any modeling paradigm is how real phenomena are represented. 
As figure 8 shows, by selecting the set of representational properties of the real 
phenomena in specific modeling, each individual object is represented directly. In 
other words, the identity of a particular object is defined independently of the other 
(concrete) objects as long as we have a global axiomatic set up (i.e., those selected 
properties) to define the generic object. Here, the generic object is the abstract 
universal, in which with different parametric values one can instantiate or 
approximate a particular object. Referring to the example of number theory, this is 
similar to the case of rational numbers, where a specific number can be generated as 
the ratio of two integers.   
Now, imagine an empirical representation of concrete objects in network-based 
representation in which nodes of connectivity, which are to specify in 
multidimensional ways, represent objects. For example, the number of cars that pass 
from one street to another, or the relation established by two individuals who select 
the same restaurant, or the relation between two cities that host offices of the same 
company, or the number of times a specific word has appeared after another specific 
word. In distinction to parametric representation of objects, the identity of an object is 
defined directly in terms of the relations it maintains with the other objects. The main 
difference between the two approaches is that in the feature (property) based 
approach, the specific identity of objects is assumed independently, while in the 
network-based representation, the identity of objects is regarded as pre-specific, and is 
specified purely relationally, out of the connectivity, which is observable. Two 
objects are considered identical if they share the same sets of relations with other 
objects.  
Figure 13 shows the representation of concrete objects in a network-based approach.  
  
Figure 13. Object-dependent representation of concrete objects in pre-specific modeling 
In specific modeling, each property has an abstract universal, but in object-object 
relations, each concrete object is a property (for example A-ness for concrete object 
A) and thus we have concrete universals for each property, as each object has an 
identity relation with itself. Assuming each concrete object as a feature, we can 
represent each object via its relation to the other objects. In comparison with the 
definition of irrational numbers by the Dedekind cut, here too the identity of a 
particular concrete object is defined as the negation of the identity of the other 
particulars. Note that here there are not yet defined generic objects—unlike the case 
of parametric object representation. 
This set up as shown in figure 13, is an object-dependent representation that is 
conceptually scalable with the size of empirical objects. While in specific modeling 
the size of parameters is independent to the number of concrete objects (i.e., 
observations), in object dependent representation, by adding one concrete object we 
directly add one new aspect for the representation of other objects. This aspect makes 
pre-specific modeling suitable for working with large amount of data. Further, in 
many areas today, the conditions for these types of representation hold, as we have an 
emergent network of connected instances that can be used for the representation of the 
object of inquiry.  
In section 8 I present two main technical frameworks that support the concept of pre-
specific modeling—two main applications of object-dependent representation. 
However, as I mentioned before implicitly, object-dependent representation and pre-
specific modeling in general are data driven, as the setup shown in figure 13 is based 
on concrete objects. The role of data in pre-specific modeling is different than 
classical empirical research when one assumes to have an a priori generic object. As 
pre-specific modeling is proposing a new modeling framework it demands another 
notion of data, one that is different than traditionally designed observations and 
measurements.  
7. Massive Unstructured Data Streams: An Inversion in the 
Notion of Measurements and Data Processing 
In classical scientific modeling, theories and a priori representations define what 
should be measured and observed. According to Bas C. van Fraassen, A measurement 
outcome is always achieved relative to particular experimental setup designed by the 
user and characterized by his theory.41 Similarly, as we showed in the case of specific 
modeling, by selecting abstract universals we limit the set of potential observable 
A"
B"
aspects of real phenomena. For example, when dealing with a pendulum model and 
using Newtonian laws of gravity as a theoretical model to describe the foundation of 
the motions of particles, data and measurements can only empirically validate or 
propose minor modifications. Therefore, classical data has always played a marginal 
role in the process of modeling.  
In addition to this conceptual setup, measurement and observation have, historically, 
been very expensive, that have pushed modelers toward more structured and designed 
and optimized experiments and observations. Taking into consideration data in 
specific modeling, figure 14 shows the classical process of modeling. As shown in the 
diagram, abstract universals (or the definition of the generic objects) are always the 
first and the primary element of modeling processes; the data—including its structure 
(i.e., the selected properties of the real environment) and its size (to be statistically 
enough)—has a supporting role in model tuning and model validation. This diagram 
shows that since the data is the secondary element, after a certain level of observation 
the model quality (in terms of accuracy for example) becomes stable, as we have 
enough data to tune the system. 
 
Figure 14. The classical modeling process (specific modeling) 
Nevertheless, considering computational technologies as the dominant factors in 
shaping and directing the area of scientific modeling of the last century, the landscape 
of measurements and data processing has been changing dramatically. In (Moosavi 
2015)42, I discuss three levels of computational capacities, known as computing 
power, computational and communicational networks, and data streams. The first 
level deals with computing power in terms of numerical simulations in comparison 
with analytical approaches. Historically, there have been different technologies of 
computation starting with mainframes, moving to the democratization of computing 
through personal computers and microcomputers, which are still getting faster and 
more powerful at an exponential rate. The primary function of computing power is 
numerical simulation, even though computers have been isolated or with limited 
communication abilities. Although computers and their simulation power opened up 
new possibilities for better understanding of the real world phenomena in 1960s and 
1970s in many fields, for a while during late 1970s, these computational models got 
data hungry and their demand for data was higher than what was available for model 
tuning and validation. This produced some skepticism about the applications of 
computational models to real world problems.43  
However, alongside the developments within computing technologies, advancements 
in communication technologies gradually opened up another capacity for modelers, 
which can be considered as the second level of computational capacities. In this level 
while computing power was given, what was important was the communication 
between computing systems. Therefore, new phenomena such as networks of sensors, 
mobile phones or computers, and the Internet started to emerge. Gradually, 
considering the amount of embedded systems in many real world applications, 
computers as computing machines became the ground to introduce new functions that 




As a byproduct of these networks of computing and communicating machines, the 
amount of digital data started to increase as well. Starting from mid 1990s, technical 
terms such as “data mining” and “database management” emerged in parallel to a 
focus on methodology to explore digital data (mainly structured data) among 
modelers. As can be seen, data began to emerge around this period, but this data was a 
byproduct of designed measurements and sensory systems. It is important to note that, 
by this time the notion of data had not changed from its old notion—collected data 
was still structured and followed by the modeler’s choices. In fact, the data still was 
the secondary element, rationally determined by the given properties of the target 
system. However, what had changed dramatically was the amount of digitally 
collected data. It started to grow quantitatively on top of the communicating and 
computational networks across disciplines.  
Finally the third level, for which we think we have a suitable notion of data for pre-
specific modeling, emerged only recently. With rapid advancements both on the level 
of computing power and the networks of computing systems, and a rapid growth in 
social media, we have encountered a new stage in which on top of ubiquitous 
computing and communicating systems, a new level of abstract phenomenon has 
started to emerge. We have begun to experience exponential growth in the amount of 
information available, together with the mobile computing devices most people use 
on a daily basis. This is often called a data deluge. Next to the challenges these 
changes bring, we can also see how new areas for research and practice are 
emerging.44,45  
It seems clear today that the classic paradigm of observation and data gathering has 
changed radically. Data is produced on an everyday basis, from nearly any activity we 
engage in, and accumulates from innumerable sources and formats such as text, 
image, GPS tracks, mobile phone traces, and many other social activities, into huge 
streams of information in digital code. These unstructured and continuous flows, 
which can be called urban data streams, can be considered as a new infrastructure 
within human societies.  
This notion of data is opposed to its classical notion, where data was produced mainly 
as the result of designed experiments to support specific hypothetical models or when 
data was transmitted via defined semantic protocols between several inter-operating 
software. These new data streams are the raw materials for further investigations; and 
similar to computing power, they hold new capacities for modeling. As a result of this 
new plateau, we are challenged to learn new ways to grasp this new richness.  
 
These massive, unstructured urban data streams induce an inversion in the paradigm 
of modeling from specific modeling, and they match the concepts of pre-specific 
modeling and models based on the concept of concrete universals. 
Therefore, as an alternative to previous modeling process, pre-specific modeling is 
mainly based on the coexistence of unstructured data streams representing particular 
objects and self-referential representation of concrete universals (figure 15). As 
shown in the next section, opposite to a specific modeling paradigm, where data has a 
limited use in modeling process and after a certain level of data size, the performance 
of models become stable in this level of data-driven modeling and object dependent 
representation. Adding more data will improve the quality of the final model. This is 
the power of concrete universals that are scalable with data size, unlike parametric 
models, in which after a certain size of data, the parametric state space of the generic 
object becomes full and reduces the discrimination power of the model in dealing 
with variety of circumstances in complex systems. By using concrete universals, each 
new instance will introduce a new aspect in relation to the other concrete instances. 
Therefore, it is scalable with data size. 
 
Figure 15. Pre-specific modeling in coexistence with unstructured data and concrete universals 
In the next section, I present a certain category of mathematical and computational 
methods, which support the notion of pre-specific modeling. 
8. Computational Methods Supporting Pre-Specific 
Modeling  
Even though I’ve presented several examples of pre-specific modeling, so far the 
explanation has remained on a conceptual level. Here I present a more technical 
discussion of two computational methods that fit very well with the concept of pre-
specific modeling.  
8.1. Markov Chains 
Andrei Markov is among the greatest mathematicians of twentieth century; he has 
made numerous contributions toward forming probability theory, but his major work 
is the concept of Markov chains, which he introduced in 1906. In engineering and 
applied scientific domains today, many people know Markov chains as a kind of 
memory less dynamic model, where having a sequence of random variables (x1, x2, 
x3,…, xt-1, xt)  the state of the system at the next step (xt+1) depends only on the 
previously observed state (xt). These processes create a chain of random activities, 
where there is a probabilistic link between adjacent nodes. Here, we assume the case 
of discrete time processes with a finite number of states, but in principle one can 
assume to have continuous time and continuous state space. Further, the chain is 
called homogeneous if the conditional distributions of xt+1 given xt were independent 
of time steps. And, assuming more sequential dependency, one can construct higher 
order chains from the state at step t depends on its n previous steps, if the order of the 
chain is n. Nevertheless, in the case of first order chains, assuming the mutual 
dependencies between any two potential states, a Markov chain can be represented 
with a directed graphical network, where each node corresponds to a state and the 
edges between two nodes correspond to two conditional probabilities. Figure 16 
shows an example of a Markov chain with three states. 
 
 









In the domain of dynamical systems, Markov chains and their many different versions 
have been studied and applied in diverse applications for the simulation of dynamical 
systems or for the study of steady state conditions. They have also been applied 
successfully to sequence and time series prediction and classification. 
Markov’s brilliant idea for the representation of a complex phenomenon such as 
natural language in a purely computational manner is particularly relevant here. 
Before going into his approach, let us unpack the traditional concept of language 
models. One of the major and to some degree dominant concepts of linguistic models 
is based on the notion of abstract universals. In this approach to modeling, which is in 
accord with Noam Chomsky’s,46 a spoken language can be modeled by means of a set 
of semantic and syntactical laws of the that specific language. Therefore, writing and 
speaking correctly by an individual means that there is a system of production in his 
or her mind that produces the instances of that language following his or her ideal 
model. This is one of the best examples of specific modeling based on the concept of 
abstract universals. However, Shillcock notes that because natural languages are 
complex evolving systems, trying to identify the ideal model of a live language is 
always a process of catch up.47 Therefore, considering the evolution and the 
exceptions and the number of different languages all over the world, this approach has 
never been successfully applied in a computational model.  
Now let us refer to the experiments of Markov in 1913, which is among the first 
linguistic models that follow the concept of concrete universals. 
In what has now become the famous first application of Markov chains, Markov, 
studied the sequence of 20,000 letters in Alexander Pushkin’s poem “Eugeny Onegin” 
to discover the conditional probabilities of sequences of the letters in an empirical 
way. What follows is the less discussed way of interpreting Markov chains, which is 
not from the traditional viewpoint of dynamical systems, but is rather about the 
empirical representation of concrete objects. Figure 17 shows the underlying concept 
of object dependent representation in Markov chains. Suppose that we have a defined 
number of symbols in a specific language (e.g., all the observed words in the English 
language). Now imagine for each specific word in the collection of our words, we 
consider all the words that have appeared N step before and N step after that specific 
word in all of our collected texts and we count the total number of occurrences. Next, 
by normalizing the total number of occurrences for each position before and after 
each specific word, we can find the empirical ratio of having any word after or before 
that specific word. Now, assuming these relations between all of the words exist, we 
have an object-dependent representation for each word based on its relation with all 
the other words. This would be a huge pre-specific representation of concrete objects. 
It is pre-specific because compared to the above-mentioned language models, in this 
mode of representation of words there is no specifically given semantic or syntactical 
property (e.g., synonym structures or grammatical rules) to the words. The whole 
network is constructed out of summation and division operations. However, as 
Markov says “many mathematicians apparently believe that going beyond the field of 
abstract reasoning into the sphere of effective calculations would be humiliating.”48 
 
Figure 17. Language representation based on concrete universals: Markov’s approach in constructing 
an empirical representation of a language’s words based on a set of observed sentences. 
Here again we have a self-referential setup, where concrete instances are implicitly 
represented by their relations to the other instances. As a result, if two particular 
words have the same function in that language, they will have similar relations with 
the other words. This was a big claim in 1906, when there wasn’t even enough 
computing power to construct these relational networks. 
As Claude Shannon later noted, even after almost forty years Markov’s proposed 
modeling framework was not practically feasible, since it demands a large number of 
observations and relatively large computational power.49 Nevertheless, as mentioned 
in section 7, the recent rapid growth in computation power has changed the situation 
dramatically and a similar approach, distributed representation, has attracted many 
researchers and practitioners.50 Further, new applications of neural probabilistic 
models of language are becoming popular, while classical approaches in natural 
language processing are still struggling for a real world and scalable application.51 
 
 
Figure 18. Distributed representation of linguistic models from Markov to the age of data deluge 
The PageRank algorithm, used in Google searches, is another important application of 
Markov chains that follows the concept of representation of objects in a concrete 
level.52 Around the year 2000, due to exponential growth in the number and diversity 
of webpages, the ranking of search results yielded by Internet search engines was 
becoming a critical issue. Prior to PageRank, most solutions sought to define a set of 
features for each webpage and then apply a scoring logic based on these features. In 
other words, the starting point for the ranking system was the act of defining a generic 
webpage, represented with a set of abstract universals. Consequently, every particular 
page would be a point in this parametric space of the generic webpage. Statistically, 
what happens is that if we increase the size of observations (i.e., the number 
webpages), No, the ratio of the number of parameters (dimensions), Np, to the number 
of observations, Np/ No, quickly gets close to zero. This means that the parametric 
space becomes full, and the discrimination of different webpages from each other 
becomes impossible. Therefore, considering the size and the diversity of webpages 
across the Internet, the process of defining features and assigning values to each page 
was a bottleneck and theoretically limited.  
With the Markov-based procedure developed in PageRank, Google did not improve 
the classic approach, but rather changed the paradigm. They changed the basic 
assumption of centralized ranking and simply assumed that individuals know best 
which pages are related and important for them—better than any axiomatic or 
semantic order could know. They looked on a micro-scale at how individuals link 
important webpages to their webpages, and based on these live streams of data, they 
constructed, continuously and adaptively, a Markov chain, mapping how people likely 
surf the Internet and thereby they constructed a probabilistic network of connections 
within the pages. They defined the importance of a webpage as the result of the 
importance of the webpages connected to that web page, which is a self-referential 











what happens is that this object-dependent representation is scalable to the size of the 
observations (webpages), since each concrete objects brings its representation with 
itself and acts as a new parameter for the representation of all the other pages (for 
simplicity’s sake, assume a binary relation of a webpage to the other pages). This 
practical application conceptually is aligned with the definition of the Dedekind cut, 
where instead of representing an object directly, each object is represented as the 
negation of its complement. 
 
 
Figure 19. A part of Google matrix: Ι=ΗΙ. Everything is represented based on every other thing. 
Fortunately, theories from linear algebra are available to solve this self-referential 
equation. The values of first Eigenvector of the constructed Markov matrix are used 
as the ranking of the pages. With the same methodology, it is possible to model 
similar problems in other fields. For example, a Markov chain based on available GPS 
trackings of cars can be used for modeling traffic dynamics in an urban street 
network,53  
 
Figure 20. A Markov chain-based representation of traffic networks from sequence of GPS tracks of cars 
in Beijing 
8.2. Self-Organizing Map 
Following the same line of argumentation for the issue of representation in complex 
systems that we had for Markov chains, there is another powerful data-driven, pre-
specific modeling method called the Self-Organizing Map (SOM).54 As a well-known 
method in machine learning, the SOM has a very rich literature with a diverse set of 
applications.55 According to the literature, the SOM is a generic methodology that has 
been applied in many classical modeling tasks such as the visualization of a high-
dimensional space,56 clustering and classification,57 and prediction and function 
approximation.58 During the past three decades there have been different extensions 
and modifications to the original algorithm that was introduced by Teuvo Kohonen in 
1982. For example, one can compare the SOM with other clustering methods or with 
space transformation and feature extraction methods such as the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).59 It is possible to explain and compare the SOM with vector 
quantization methods.60 Further, it is possible to explain the SOM as a nonlinear 
function approximation method and to see it as a type of neural network methods and 
radial basis function.61 
However, in this work I present two main aspects of the SOM in relation to the idea 
of pre-specific representation and in comparison with other modernist mathematical 
approaches, which are based on the notions of ideals and abstract universals. 
8.2.1. No More External Dictionary and No More Generic Object 
As discussed in section 5, in specific modeling the observations of any real 
phenomena are encoded in a generic object being represented by a set of given 
parameters. The underlying idea of pre-specific modeling is how to relax the 
modeling process from any specific and idealistic representation of the real 
phenomena—or, how not to depend on the generic object. For example, as mentioned 
before, in a Fourier transformation we assume that any dynamic behavior can be 
reconstructed and re-presented by a set of ideal cyclic forms. As figure 21 shows, an 
observed signal can be decomposed or can be approximated as a linear summation of 
some ideal waves. In other words, here we assume that there is a generic sinusoidal 
wave (as an ideal behavior) with a parametric setup, and by changing the parameters 
of this generic function there are different instances of waves. Finally, an observed 
signal can be represented as a summation of these ideal waves as follows: 𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑎!2 + 𝑎!𝑐𝑜𝑠 𝑛𝜔𝑡 + 𝑏!sin  (𝑛𝜔𝑡)!!!!  
 
Figure 21. Reconstruction of an observed signal (top row) based on a parametric dictionary of ideal 
waves in Fourier decomposition 
Therefore, the Fourier transformation is among the specific models that are based on 
abstract universals. As discussed, although powerful and useful in many classical 
engineering and scientific applications, this approach of idealized modeling has 
fundamental limits in dealing with complex (multifaceted) phenomena. The opposite 
idea or the complementary idea in pre-specific modeling is that based on the concept 
of concrete universals, it might be possible to establish a self-referential setup using 
concrete objects (i.e., the observations) to model real phenomena without any external 
representation or any external control. In the domain of machine learning, this is the 
underlying idea of unsupervised learning. Interestingly, the SOM corresponds with 
the idea of representation based on concrete universals. Comparing to Fourier 
decomposition, shown in figure 21, if we train a SOM with enough observations, we 
get a dictionary of potential dynamic forms collected via real observations (figure 22). 
In assuming each of the prototypical forms in the trained SOM as a word or a letter in 
a language, a trained SOM can be used as pre-specific dictionary for the target 
phenomena. In other words, in terms of signal processing, assuming a fixed 
segmentation size, the observed signal can be translated into a set of numerical 
indexes (i.e., the index of the matching prototypes in the SOM network with each 
segment of the observation vector)—further, these indexes will be used for further 
steps of modeling. The main point is that unlike the case of Fourier decomposition, 
here there is no external axiomatic setup for the transformation of observations into 




Figure 22. Self-organizing maps: constructing a pre-specific dictionary of dynamic forms from a large 
collection of observed signals. 
Further, in a certain topology of SOM networks, the final indexes can be used to 
transform a multidimensional dynamic system into a one-dimensional symbolic 
dynamic system. In this case, the indexes of the SOM can be considered as 
“contextual numbers.”62 
In the field of computer vision and speech processing there has been a growing trend 
of methods that are based on the idea of representation that outperform many classical 
pattern recognition methods only in coexistence with a large amount of observations 
based on feature engineering. Classically, feature engineering means that in order to 
develop a pattern recognition model (i.e., in an image classification problem), one 
first needs to design a feature space to transform the images by that and then to 
develop a classification model on top of the engineered features. In the example of the 
Fourier analysis, the frequency and phase difference are the features. On the other 
hand, in this new category of modeling, some times called representation learning, 
there is no specific and separate feature-engineering task before fitting the 
classification or prediction method.63 Among these algorithms, is the sparse coding 
algorithm, which has conceptual similarities with the SOM.64 The principle idea of 
sparse coding is that if the original observations are n dimensional vectors, one can 
finds an over complete set of vectors (i.e., K vectors, where K>>n) to reconstruct the 
original observations with a linear and sparse combination of these K vectors. While 
it looks similar to methods such as PCA65 or Independent Component Analysis 
(ICA),66 sparse coding (similar to the SOM algorithm) does not produce a global 
transformation matrix. In PCA for example, all the n orthogonal basis vectors 
proportionally (according to their corresponding eigenvalues) contribute to the 
representation of all of the original observations, but in the SOM and sparse coding 
we have a kind of “distributed representation,” in which each original observation is 
directly represented by a few specific prototypes (basis vectors). In other words, in the 
SOM each prototype is an object, which is not true for each principal component in 
PCA. They are from different worlds. 
Further, this encoding approach can be applied in a hierarchical process. For example, 
in the case of image processing it can be applied to small patches of an image, where 
each patch will be indexed to a few codes and the next level (for example the whole 
image) will then be represented by new codes constructed on top of the previous 
codes. In fact, the output of one step is used as input for the next layer. Therefore, the 
whole image is analyzed by multilevel sparse codes. This simple idea of coding in an 
unsupervised approach has been applied in many practical applications and it has 
been claimed that it works better than the wavelet decomposition method.67 I should 
note that the wavelets act similarly to the Fourier series, but they are more advanced, 
since there is no longer the assumption that the underlying ideal waves are stationary. 
Figure 23 shows an example of a sparse coding algorithm applied to image patches. 
 
 
Figure 23. Sparse coding: learning data driven image dictionaries68 
8.2.2. Computing with Indexes Beyond Ideal Curves  
Another property of the SOM is its unique disposition for structural learning. Figure 
24 shows the main difference between the SOM and a classical way of relation 
(function) modeling. In simple terms, the primary goal of relation modeling is to find 
the relation between two dimensions, based on a set of observations. In a classical 
way of modeling, one needs to fit a curve (a fixed structure) to a data set, while 
minimizing the deviations (errors) from the selected curve. In other words, the 
selected curve represents the logic that idealizes the observed data into a continuous 
relation. The SOM assumes that the logics (the argument that integrates cases) can be 
extracted from within the observed data—and it conserves all the logics (arguments) 
according to which it clusters the cases. What is optimized, in such modeling, is not 
how the data fits to logic, but the logic, which is being engendered, as much as 
possible from the data.  
In this sense, in an analogy to a governance and decision-making system, we might 
say that the classical approach in curve fitting is a democratic setup, in which there is 
a global structure, tuned locally by the effect of individual votes. On the other hand, 
the SOM provides a social environment, in which each individual instance is not 
reduced but is kept active in its own individuality, while individuals can be unified 
into local clusters, if necessary. 
 
Figure 24. Computing with indexes beyond Ideal curves 
Here again, the final model of the real phenomena is an abstraction of any potential 
specific model and it does not import any axiomatic or semantic specificity. Further, 
if the real environment is dynamic and evolving, and if we can assume the availability 
of dynamic data streams, then the SOM evolves along with the environment. In other 




1 Kevin Lynch, Good City Form (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). 
2 Manuel Castells, The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, 
and the Urban-Regional Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 15. 
3 A. G. Wilson, Urban Modelling: Critical Concepts in Urban Studies, vols. 1–5 
(London: Routledge, 2012). 
4 L Von Bertalanffy, (1993). General system theory. George Braziller. Traduction française: 
Théorie générale des systèmes, Dunod. 
5 George J. Klir, Architecture of Systems Complexity (New York: Saunders, 1985). 
6 Roman Frigg and Stephan Hartmann, “Models in Science,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/. 
 
                                                                                                                             
7 Ibid. 
8 Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1962). 
9 Ernan McMullin, “Galilean Idealization,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 
16, no. 3 (1985): 47–73. 
10 Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (London: Sheed and Ward, 1963). 
11 Ernan McMullin, “What do physical models tell us?” Studies in Logic and the Foundations 
of Mathematics 52 (1968): 385–96. 
12 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, “What is the problem of universals?” Mind 109, no. 434 
(2000): 255–73. 
13 McMullin, “Galilean Idealization”; Leszek Nowak, “Laws of Science, Theories, 
Measurement,” Philosophy of Science XXXIX (1972): 533–48; Michael Weisberg, “Three 
Kinds of Idealization,” The Journal of Philosophy (2007): 639–59. 
14 Weisberg, “Three Kinds of Idealization.”  
15 Mark Newman, Networks: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
16 Luís M. A. Bettencourt et al., “Growth, Innovation, Scaling, and the Pace of Life in Cities,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 17 (2007): 7301–7306. 
17 Michael Batty, “The Size, Scale, and Shape of Cities,” Science 319, no. 5864 (February 8, 
2008): 769–71. 
18 David Grahame Shane, Recombinant Urbanism: Conceptual Modeling in Architecture, 
Urban Design, and City Theory (Chichester: Wiley, 2005). 
19 Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E. Raftery, “Weather Forecasting with Ensemble 
Methods,” Science 310, no. 5746 (2005): 248–49. 
20 John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2000). 
21 Waldo Tobler, “Cellular Geography,” in Philosophy in Geography, eds. Stephen Gale and 
Gunnar Olsson (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), 379–86. 
22 Benoit Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (New York: W. H. Freeman & Co., 
1982). 
23 Matthew R. Evans et al., “Do simple models lead to generality in ecology?” Trends in 
Ecology & Evolution 28, no. 10 (2013): 578–83; Matthew R. Evans et al., “Data Availability 
and Model Complexity, Generality, and Utility: A Reply to Lonergan,” Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution 29, no. 6 (2014); Mike Lonergan, “Data Availability Constraints Model Complexity, 
Generality, and Utility: A Response to Evans et al.,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 29, no. 6 
(2014). 
24 Ellerman, D. P. (1988). Category theory and concrete universals. Erkenntnis, 28(3), 409-
429. 
25 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2000). What is the Problem of Universals?. Mind, 109(434), 255-
273. 
26 Ellerman, “Category Theory and Concrete Universals,” PG 410 
27 Ibid., PG 410 
28 Ibid., PG 411 
29 David  Ellerman,  “On Concrete Universals: A Modern Treatment Using Category Theory” 
(May 10, 2014).., PG 6. 
30 Saunders Mac Lane and Ieke Moerdijk, Sheaves in Geometry and Logic: A First 
Introduction to Topos Theory (New York: Springer, 1992). 
31 Ellerman, D. (2014). On Concrete Universals: A Modern Treatment using Category Theory. 
32 Shillcock, R. (2014). The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science. Axiomathes, 24(1), 
63-80. 
33 Panu Raatikainen, “Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/goedel-incompleteness/. 
34 Ellerman, D. P. (1988). Category theory and concrete universals. Erkenntnis, 28(3), 409-
429. 
35 Wassermann, K. (2013). That Centre-Point Thing—The Theory Model in Model Theory. 
In Applied Virtuality Book Series Printed Physics—Metalithikum I (pp. 156-188). Springer 
Vienna. 
 
                                                                                                                             
36 Richard Bellman, Adaptive Control Processes: A Guided Tour 4 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1961). 
37 Shillcock, R. (2014). The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science. Axiomathes, 24(1), 
63-80. 
38 Bühlmann, V., & Wiedmer, M. (Eds.). (2008). Pre-Specifics: Some Comparatistic 
Investigations on Research in Design and Art. Zurich: JRP Ringier. 
39 Richard Dedekind, “The Nature and Meaning of Numbers,” in Essays on the Theory of 
Numbers, trans. W. W. Beman (Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1901 [1898]). 
40 Ludger Hovestadt, Vera Buhlmann, “Eigen architecture”, Ambra; Bilingual edition, 2014.  
41 Van Fraassen, B. C. (2010). Scientific representation: Paradoxes of perspective. 
42 Moosavi, V. (2015, April). Computational Urban Modeling: From Mainframes to Data 
Streams. In AAAI Workshop: AI for Cities. 
43 Lee Jr, D. B. (1973). Requiem for large-scale models. Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners, 39(3), 163-178. 
44 Greenfield, A. (2010). Everyware: The dawning age of ubiquitous computing. New Riders. 
45 Hansmann, U., Merk, L., Nicklous, M. S., & Stober, T. (2003). Pervasive computing: The 
mobile world. Springer Science & Business Media. 
46 Chomsky, N. (2000). Linguistics and brain science. Image, language, brain, 13-28. 
47 Shillcock, R. (2014). The Concrete Universal and Cognitive Science. Axiomathes, 24(1), 
63-80. 
48 Basharin, G. P., Langville, A. N., & Naumov, V. A. (2004). The life and work of AA 
Markov. Linear Algebra and its Applications, 386, 3-26. 
49 Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication, Part I, Part II. Bell Syst. 
Tech. J., 27, 623-656. 
50 Bengio, Y., Courville, A., & Vincent, P. (2013). Representation learning: A review and new 
perspectives. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence, 35(8), 1798-
1828. 
51 Bengio, Y., Ducharme, R., Vincent, P., & Jauvin, C. (2003). A neural probabilistic language 
model. Journal of machine learning research, 3(Feb), 1137-1155. 
52 Brin, S., & Page, L. (1998). The anatomy of a large-scale hypertexual web search 
engine. Computer networks and ISDN systems, 30(1-7), 107-117. 
53 Moosavi, V., & Hovestadt, L. (2013, August). Modeling urban traffic dynamics in 
coexistence with urban data streams. In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGKDD International 
Workshop on Urban Computing (p. 10). ACM. 
54 Kohonen, T. (1982). Self-organized formation of topologically correct feature 
maps. Biological cybernetics, 43(1), 59-69. 
55 Kohonen, T. (2013). Essentials of the self-organizing map. Neural networks, 37, 52-65. 
56 Vesanto, J. (1999). SOM-based data visualization methods. Intelligent data analysis, 3(2), 
111-126. 
57 Ultsch, A. (1993). Self-organizing neural networks for visualisation and classification. 
In Information and classification (pp. 307-313). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
58 Barreto, G. A., & Araujo, A. F. (2004). Identification and control of dynamical systems using 
the self-organizing map. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 15(5), 1244-1259. 
59 Yin, H. (2008). Learning nonlinear principal manifolds by self-organising maps. In Principal 
manifolds for data visualization and dimension reduction(pp. 68-95). Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg. 
60 Bishop, C. M., Svensén, M., & Williams, C. K. (1998). GTM: The generative topographic 
mapping. Neural computation, 10(1), 215-234. 
61 Barreto, G. A., & Araujo, A. F. (2004). Identification and control of dynamical systems using 
the self-organizing map. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 15(5), 1244-1259. 
62 Moosavi, V. (2014). Computing With Contextual Numbers. arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.0889. 
63 Bengio, Y., Courville, A., & Vincent, P. (2013). Representation learning: A review and new 
perspectives. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and machine intelligence, 35(8), 1798-
1828. 
64 Olshausen, B. A., & Field, D. J. (1996). Emergence of simple-cell receptive field properties 
by learning a sparse code for natural images. Nature, 381(6583), 607. 
 
                                                                                                                             
65 Pearson, K. (1901). LIII. On lines and planes of closest fit to systems of points in 
space. The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of 
Science, 2(11), 559-572. 
66 Aapo, H., Juha, K., & Erkki, O. (2001). Independent component analysis. Willey, New York. 
67 Olshausen, B. A., & Field, D. J. (1996). Emergence of simple-cell receptive field properties 
by learning a sparse code for natural images. Nature, 381(6583), 607. 
68 Hughes, J. M., Graham, D. J., & Rockmore, D. N. (2010). Quantification of artistic style 
through sparse coding analysis in the drawings of Pieter Bruegel the Elder. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 107(4), 1279-1283. 
 
 
